The Siege of Damascus (1148): The Central Disaster of the Second Crusade
The Siege of Damascus in 1148 was the central military event of the Second Crusade and one of the most embarrassing defeats in the history of the Crusades. The combined armies of King Louis VII of France, King Conrad III of Germany, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem marched on the great city of Damascus in late June 1148, expecting an easy victory. The chronicler William of Tyre, who drew on eyewitness accounts, recorded that the army even sent a letter to the emir, demanding his surrender and offering him a fief in the Kingdom of Jerusalem if he would accept Christian rule. Instead, the siege collapsed after only four days, and the Crusaders withdrew in disarray. The defeat at Damascus marked a turning point in the history of the Crusades, exposing the limits of the expeditionary ideal and emboldening the Muslim leaders of the East, including Saladin, whose career would dominate the second half of the 12th century.
For the broader story, see the main article on the Second Crusade and the role of Bernard of Clairvaux. For the question of why the Second Crusade failed, see the dedicated article.
Damascus in the 12th Century
Damascus was one of the great cities of the medieval Islamic world. The capital of the Umayyad Caliphate in the 7th and 8th centuries, it had remained a major center of culture, trade, and religion under successive Muslim dynasties. In the 12th century, Damascus was ruled by a succession of Turkish and Arab emirs, who were generally friendly to the Latin East and who had been useful counterweights to the more dangerous Zengid dynasty of Aleppo and Mosul.
The emir of Damascus in 1148 was Mu’in ad-Din Anar, a Turkish ruler who had been a sometime ally of the Latin East. The relationship between Damascus and the Kingdom of Jerusalem had been complicated but generally peaceful, and many Latin merchants lived in Damascus. The decision to attack the city was therefore controversial, and it has been the subject of intense historical debate. The question of why Damascus was chosen is examined in why the Second Crusade failed.
The Choice of Damascus
The decision to attack Damascus was made in early 1148, after several months of negotiation between the leaders of the Second Crusade and the Latin rulers of the Holy Land. The original objective of the expedition had been the recovery of Edessa, which had fallen to Zengi in 1144, but by 1148 that objective had been quietly abandoned. The army was in no condition to march into northern Mesopotamia, and the Latin rulers of the Holy Land preferred a local target.
Three possible targets were discussed: Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus. Aleppo was too far away and too strongly defended. Homs was a smaller target and would not deliver a decisive blow. Damascus was the most attractive target: a wealthy city, a major center of trade, and a key strategic point on the road to the rest of the Muslim world. The Latin rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had long considered the conquest of Damascus to be a desirable objective, and the presence of the Crusader kings offered an opportunity.
The choice of Damascus was controversial at the time, and it has been criticized by modern historians. The emir of Damascus had been a useful counterweight to the Zengid dynasty, and his removal would open the way for Zengi’s successor, Nur ad-Din, to dominate Syria. The Latin rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem knew this, and some of them opposed the attack. The decision was made by the combined leadership of the Crusade, with Baldwin III of Jerusalem and the royal leaders overruling local objections.
The March on Damascus
The Crusader army gathered at the Springs of Cresson, near Nazareth, in late June 1148. The combined forces of Louis VII, Conrad III, and Baldwin III numbered perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 effective combatants, plus a substantial non-combatant train. The army marched to Banias, on the northern border of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, and then turned south toward Damascus.
The march was unopposed, and the Crusaders arrived before Damascus on 24 July 1148. The army was confident of success. Damascus was a wealthy city, but it was not strongly defended: the garrison was perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 troops, and the fortifications, while substantial, were not in the same league as those of Antioch or Jerusalem. The Crusaders expected to take the city quickly.
The Crusaders initially camped on the eastern side of the city, near the orchards and gardens that surrounded the walls. The site was well-chosen, with access to water and supplies. The army was in good order, and the leaders were confident of success. According to William of Tyre, the chronicler of the expedition, the Crusaders even sent a letter to the emir, demanding his surrender and offering him a fief in the Kingdom of Jerusalem if he would accept Christian rule.
The Decision to Move
The siege of Damascus was, at first, going well. The Crusaders established a blockade of the city, and the garrison was clearly demoralized. The emir sent messages to the Zengid ruler Nur ad-Din, asking for assistance. The Christian chroniclers record that the Crusaders were on the verge of taking the city. Then, on 27 July, the Crusaders made the fateful decision to move their camp.
The reasons for the move are not entirely clear. The most common explanation in the Christian sources is that the eastern side of the city was too well-defended, and the Crusaders needed a better approach. But modern historians have suggested that the move was motivated by a combination of factors, including the lack of water on the eastern side, the failure of the local Christian community to support the siege, and the political pressure of the Latin rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, who had commercial interests in the orchards and gardens that the Crusaders were damaging.
Whatever the reason, the move was a disaster. The Crusaders moved to the western side of the city, where they had no access to water and no natural defenses. The garrison, which had been on the verge of surrender, took heart and launched a series of sorties against the Crusader positions. Worse, Nur ad-Din had begun to gather a relief force, and the Crusaders were now caught between the city and the approaching Zengid army.
The Collapse of the Siege
The collapse of the siege was swift. On 28 July, the Crusaders were attacked by the garrison and by a relief force that had arrived from the south. The attack was repulsed, but the Crusaders were forced to abandon their positions and retreat. The retreat quickly turned into a rout. The Crusaders withdrew to the north, with the Muslim forces in pursuit.
The reasons for the collapse are complex. The Crusaders were exhausted from the march and the siege, and they were short of supplies. The Latin rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, who had been skeptical of the attack on Damascus, withdrew their forces. The relationship between the French and German contingents had been strained throughout the expedition, and the failure at Damascus did not improve it. The Muslim forces, despite being outnumbered, were better organized and more determined.
The collapse of the siege was a profound shock. The Latin East had hoped for a great victory, and the embarrassing defeat exposed the limits of the Crusading ideal. The Second Crusade had been the largest expedition yet mounted by Latin Christendom, and its failure at Damascus was a major setback.
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the failure at Damascus was severe. The Latin East was in a worse position than it had been before. Nur ad-Din used the breathing space to consolidate his power in Syria, and the Latin territories came under increasing pressure. The recovery of Edessa, which had been the original objective of the Second Crusade, was now a distant prospect.
The failure at Damascus also had consequences in Europe. Bernard of Clairvaux, who had been the public face of the expedition, was widely blamed. The Latin rulers of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, who had chosen Damascus as the target, were also criticized. The expedition had been a major investment of resources, and its failure was a heavy blow to the prestige of the Latin Church and the Latin East.
The failure at Damascus also had long-term consequences for the Crusading ideal. The Second Crusade had been the first royal expedition to the East, and its failure raised questions about whether kings should lead such expeditions. The Third Crusade would be led by kings, but it would also fail to achieve its central objective. The lessons of 1148 were clear: the Crusades were not a guaranteed path to victory, and even the most powerful armies could be defeated by determined Muslim resistance.